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Did an Iowan Start a War in the Indies?
BY JAMES WAHREN GOXJLD
One of the legends of the Indies is that an. Iowan,
Adolphus G. Studer, caused a war which ended
in the conquest of the last remaining independent area of
the Indies, the Sultanate of Atjeh. Here, for the first
time, the true story can be told through the courtesy of
the Dutch Government which opened its archives to this
writer.
Adolphus G. Studer was born in Bern Canton, Switzer-
land in 1831.^  Having come to the United States as a
young man, he was naturalized an American citizen. As
first heutenant in the 15th Iowa Infantry under General
W. W. Belknap, he was wounded at the battle of Shiloh
(1862) and promoted to captain. He resigned from ac-
tive service before the end of the war, but served as
captain and then brevet major in the United States
Volunteers until 1866. He then took part in the Recon-
struction, serving as General Superintendent of Educa-
tion in Louisiana. He then resided on a farm fifteen
miles from Des Moines, Iowa, while working with the
State Bank of Iowa. With the influence of his former
commanding officer, W. W. Belknap, who had become
Secretary of War, he was appointed American Consul
1 For Mr. Studer's early life the help of Emory H. English of tlie
ANNALS OF IOWA, Iowa State Dept. of History, Des Moines, is grate-
fully acknowledged. His official caroer is from U.S. Dept of State,
Consular Reports, Foreign Affairs Records Group, National Archives,
Wasliington (hereafter cited as State), Singapore, Vols. 8 and 20;
Barmen, Vol. 5 in Siafe; Register 1889 and 1892 in State; and van
de Putte to Read, March 6, 1873 in Buiten., Singapore, VoL 100.
81
82 ANNALS OF IOWA
in Singapore in 1871. He served there faithfully until
1899 when his health and age suggested a transfer to
Frankfurt. The Department of State found a vacancy
for him at Barmen, Germany, where he served until he
was 62. He was then transferred back to Singapore
where he served only a short time longer, but he con-
tinued to live there until 1894.
The reader will agree that from such a long career of
devotion to relatively obscure public service and con-
servative antecedents one can hardly expect the ad-
venturesome disposition of a filibusterer.
Studer arrived in Singapore in September, 1871. Up
to that time the political interests of the United States
government in Sumatra^ had always been completely
non-territorial. The United States has confined its po-
litical contacts to the protection of American citizens
and their commerce. To implement this, the conclu-
sion of treaties of commerce and navigation had been
frequently suggested. Although the Americans never
desired any territorial concessions, the fact that com-
mercial treaties were often used by the Europeans as
the prelude to conquest probably made the Europeans
fear similar American ambitions. There were certainly
many opportunities to conclude treaties with the inde-
pendent powers of Sumatra, or even obtain territorial
concessions if they had been desired. However, the ad-
venturer Walter M. Gibson was the only American
who ever had any such territorial ambitions, and in
them he did not have the support of his government.
Yet repeatedly in history the Americans have been ac-
cused by the European powers in Sumatra of having
territorial ambitions. Upon investigation these claims
prove to have had no substance.
In 1872, at a time when American mercantile interests
in Sumatra were virtually at an end, the United States
briefly considered a commercial treaty with Atjeh.
This was the last opportunity to conclude such a pact,
- See Could, James W., "Sumatra—America's Pepperpot 1784-1873,"
Essex In^tute Historical Collections, Vol. 92, (1956), Nos. 2, 3 and 4.
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considering that commercial interests in Atjeh termina-
ted in 1866. It could hardly be expected that the treaty
would have received any support in the United States,
let alone agreement to a political concession.
Dutch historians have almost universally accepted
the story of the origins of the Dutch conquest of Atjeh
that was given out by the Netherlands government to
justify its actions.^ That story, in summary, is that the
Atjehnese refused to live up to their promises of 1858
to suppress "piracy," and while the Dutch were negotia-
ting this matter, the Sultan's envoys treacherously con-
cluded treaties with agents of various foreign powers
at Singapore, primarily the United States. To fore-
stall foreign intervention, the Dutch armies invaded
Atjeh. Therefore the actions of the American Consul
in Singapore, Adolphus G. Studer, have been put in
the worst light of conspiracy against the Dutch. By im-
plication, the motives of the United States government
are impugned.
As the history books now stand, the United States
is partially responsible for the tragic Atjeh war which
lasted thirty-five years and cost many Dutch and Indo-
nesian lives. Since this is the only story presented,
American and English authors have accepted it with-
out question. However, several obscure Dutch publica-
tions suggest some contrivance of the story by a Dutch
agent."* Very recently the eminent Dutch historian,
Bernard H. M. Vlekke, quite independently also d i s -
covered documents in the American, archives which
suggest such a conspiracy.^
3 Netherlands Ministry of Colonies, Offideele Beschieden betreffende
het onstaan van den oorlog tegen Atjeh in 1873 (The Hague: Alg.
Landsdnikkery, 1881} is the usual source of Dutch liistorians, supple-
niented by the account of the Minister of Colonies, Eg. de Waal, Onze
Indische Financien, Nicwe Reeks, Vol. 6, pp. 230-242.
* A Dutch naval ofFicer in Atjeh referred to the discovery of
American plots througli the "slyness and cunning" of a Dutch agent:
J. A. Kruyt, Atjeh en de Atjehers (Leiden: Kolff, 1877), p. 8. E.
Nyland, Schetsen uit Insulinde (Utrecht: H. E. Breyer, 1892), p. 224^
says that a Dutch spy "played a very treacherous role in this affair.
5 B. H. M. ylekke, Nusantara, pp. 299-500, written wliile the author
was in the United States, was the first recognition of the American
documents.
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ORIGINS OF THE ATJEH WAR; THE SUMATEIA TREATY
That expansive movement of the Dutch in Sumatra,
which was stimulated in part by an American flli-
busterer Gibson in 1853, had by no means ended in the
lSeO's.*^ The absorption of the native states of the East
Coast was almost as slow a process as it had been in
the west. This was particularly t rue because the British
protested the "arbitrary and encroaching policy" and
"aggression" of the Dutch every inch of the way.'' By
1865 the tide of advance had reached the borders of
Atjeh proper after the absorption of the former feu-
datory states of Atjeh on the East Coast. Dutch interest
in the border march of Tamiang, which lay barely
within Atjeh like Trumon on the West Coast, natural ly
brought up the declarations in the Treaty of 1824
relative to the independence of Atjeh.
Dutch advances were largely conducted from their
East Coast administrative center of Riau. Since the
British watchpost for North Sumatra was at Singapore,
the Dutch Consul there was in a key position to
gauge British opinion and to assist moves at Riau. Hold-
ing the post of Netherlands Consul at Singapore was
a British citizen, William H. Read. He strongly favored
Dutch expansion and was a close acquaintance of the
Dutch Minister of Colonies, Fransen van de Put te .
Read's character is revealed by his own letter in which
he quoted the British governor of the Straits saying,
"The Straits people have no confidence in your sin-
cerity."^
It is clear from both the Dutch and the British ar-
^ Lt. Gen. J. van Swieten who commanded the Second Expedition
against Atjeh in 1873 cited Gibson's attempt as an example of the de-
signs of foreign powers that justified (to the author) the Atjeh War:
Do Waarheid over Onze Vestiging in Atjeh (Zalt Bommel: Joh. No-
man, 1879), p. 7.
"^ For example, British Minister in The Hague to the Dutch Foreign
Office, April 13, 1863 in Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Buiterdands Zaken, Algemein Ryksarchief, The Hague (hereafter cited
as Buiten), Legatie Groot Brittanie, Vol. 192; Brit. Minister to Foreign
office. May 27, 1865 in Buiten, Vol. 3136.
8 W. W. Read to Fransen van de Putte, Oct. 25, 1864, No. 9769,
p. 2 in Buiten, Vol. 3136.
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chives that until mid-1868 there was no suggestion
whatever of changing the status of Atjeh, or of British
complaint about "piracy." British complaints for over
four decades were solely directed against discrimina-
tory trade restrictions which resulted from the Dutch
expansion in Sumatra.
The first change came in mid-1868 when Engelbertus
de Waal became the Dutch Minister of Colonies. This
man had considerable experience in the Indies and
was well-known for his writings on colonial policy. At
this time Read visited The Hague and with the know-
ledge of Dutch officials approached the British For-
eign Office about problems in Sumatra and was able
to report home that the British were favorable to some
proposal of settlement.'^ Accordingly, in his first
interview with the British Minister at The Hague, Ad-
miral E. A. J. Harris, de Waal mentioned the Dutch
acquisition of Atjeh for the first time. The suggestion
originated with the Dutch and had no excuse except
the mission civilisatrice.^'^
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 gave Atjeh
new strategic importance, placing it on the new gate-
way to the Orient.^^ After protracted negotiations
between the Dutch and British, largely over Dutch
reservations about free trade, a treaty was finally con-
cluded with the essential provision which had origina-
ted with the Dutch suggestion, withdrawing British
objections to Dutch conquest of Atjeh.^^ The British
consent was incorporated in the famuous Sumatra
Treaty of November 2, 1871, as Article One:
Her Britannic Majesty desists from all objections against the ex-
Ö Read to van de Putte, May 8, 1863, No. 3552, p. 3 in Buiten.
Vol. 3136.
10 Harris to Foreign Secretary Stanley, July 24, 1868, No. 66 in
Great Britain, Foreign Office, F.O. 37/487, Public Record Office
London.
^^  For Dutch recognition of this factor, see H. Blink, Opkomst en
Onttmkkeling van Sumatra als Econoniisch-Geographisch Gebied, p.
70 and E. S. de Klerck, History of the Netherlands East Indies, Vol. 2,
pp. 342, 336.
12 Article One of November draft and Article Eight of final
treaty of 1870 in Buiten Vol. 3136, Nos. 7455 and 1952.
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tensions of tlie Netherland Dominion on any part of the island of
Sumatra and consequently from the reserve in that respect contained
in the notes exclianged by the Netherlands and Britisli plenipoten-
tiaries at the conclusion of tlie treaty of 17 March 1824.1^
Dutch and British archives clearly show that: (1)
the Dutch contemplated the annexation of Atjeh since
1868, and insisted on the use of military force after
1870, (2) that the Dutch and not the British initiated
the idea, and <3) that "piracy" was not a British com-
plaint, but a Dutch excuse for aggression.^ ^ This
should dispel any question of the responsibility for the
origins of the war.
THE SINGAPORE PLOT
After the conclusion of the treaty of 1870, the
Netherlands Indies Government under Governor-Gen-
eral Junker J. Loudon attempted to obtain Atjehnese
assent to a new treaty which would annex Atjeh to
the Dutch East Indies. The new Dutch overtures to
Atjeh were made as tactlessly and were rejected as
peremptorily as most of the others of the past 270 years.
The Vice President of the Council of the Indies, i.e.,
equivalent to chief of Loudon's cabinet, Frederik N.
Nieuwenhuyzen, was largely responsible for the negotia-
tions.
Most of the local negotiations were conducted by
the Resident of Riau, Schiff. There being no direct
cable to Batavia, most of Schiff's messages passed
through the hands of the Dutch Consul General in
Singapore, William H. Read, who we have seen was
13 Text in Sir Edward Hertslet, Comp., [Commercial] Treaties and
Conventiona between Great Britian ana Foreign Powers (31 Vols.,
London: H. M. Stationery OfBce, 1827-1935,) Vol. 13, pp. 665-666;
Dutch copy is Kabinet No. 3/218 in Buiten., Legatie Gr. Brit., Vol. 193.
^* There is not one piece of evidence in the American or Dutch
archives to prove that the United States ever complained about
piracy as asserted by some authors, for example, A. W, S. O'SuUivan's
introduction to C. Snouck Hnrgronje, The Achehnese, Vol. 1, pp. vii,
ix; A. Kruisheer, Atjeh 1896 (2 Vols., Weltevreden: Visser, 1913),
Vol. 2, pp. 240, 242. de Klerck, History, Vol. 2, gives a fair picture of
the truth of "piracy" stories (p. 342) and notes that Dutch conquests
certainly did not eliminate the abuses ( p. 359 ), Nor is tliere any
dcKimicntary evidence that a British fear of an American base in
Atjeh motivated British concessions as asserted by de Klerck, History,
Vol. 2, p. 336 and Amry Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies
(Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1941), p. 376.
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deeply interested in Dutch expansion in Sumatra. In
1868 his visit to Europe had paved the way to British
abnegation with respect to Atjeh as we have men-
tioned, and another visit to the Dutch Minister of Colo-
nies probably concerned Sumatra. Since 1861 Read
had "given aid" to an indigent Sumatran prince, Tunku
Mohamed Arifin of Moco-Moco. Arifin acknowledged
being a Dutch subject and had applied for a job under
the Dutch in Singapore. This was granted to him, for
Read gave him money frequently thereafter, and Arifin
often reported to Read about various political affairs.^".
According to Studer, it was in the summer of 1872
that Arifin first approached him.^^ Arifin inquired
whether the United States would help him regain his
father's throne in Sumatra. Studer very properly re-
plied that the United States could not interfere in the
matter. When Arifin asked why America did not
annex colonies in the Indies, such as Atjeh, Studer
astutely replied "that it was not our policy to annex
in like manner; and, at most, all we wanted, was to
make treaties of peace and commerce."
THE ATJEHNESE APPEAL FOR AID
By September 1872 it was common knowledge that
the Dutch were gathering forces to invade Atjeh. The
Atjehnese premier, Panglima Tibang, went to Singa-
pore to appeal to the Governor of the Straits under the
Raffles treaty of 1819, but the British adhered to their
most recent agreement not to obstruct a Dutch con-
^5 First use of restricted material in the Dutch Archives: Frocés
Verbal of Arifin, July 27, 1873, end. 1 to Minister of Colonies to
Foreign Minister, Nov. 15, 1873, No. Q 30 in Ruiten., Stukken
besreffende den Oorlog met Atjeh (hereafter cited as Atjeh), Vol.
Ralll (July 1, 1873-Jan. 1, 1874). Dutch writers are aware of Read's
employment of Arifin, for instance, van Swieten, De Waarheid, p. 11
and de Klerck, History, Vol. 2, pp. 346-347.
16 The date of their initial meeting varies: 1864 in SchifF to Louden,
Feh. 24, 1873, p. 2 in file May 14, 1873 Kab. 5, Atjeh, Vol. Ral
(Jan. 1-July 1, 1873); 1863 in Read to Gen. Secretary, Batavia,
Feb. 28, 1873, No. 26, Singapore Vol. 8, p. 144 in State; 1861 in Arifin
to Read, Feb. 14, 1873 in file May 14, 1873 Kab. 5, Atjeh, Ral.
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quest of Atjeh.i^ They put Tibang off with false as-
surances of Dutch good intentions. Ingratiating him-
self with the Atjehnese premier. Read's agent, Arifin,
was able to become his spokesman. In that capacity
he approached Studer on September 17, 1872, and ap-
pealed for American aid and a treaty of assistance. To
this Studer merely asked for a written appeal.
It was probably a result of Arifin's passing this
reply to him that Panglima Tibang said, "I hope to
come back here soon with a letter from our prince to
the Consul." Arifin told Read about the possibility
of a written request for aid. But curiously Read
failed to report to Batavia that which he did report
six months later in a tone of alarm implying recent
discovery. Studer became quite enthusiastic about the
treaty idea, but mentioned only to a few Americans
the resources of Sumatra, the benefit to navigation,
and "how a now happy and independent people would
escape serfdom." However, Studer said, "In annexa-
tion I did not believe."
UNITED STATES NAVY CONSIDERS ATJEH
One of the Americans to whom Studer mentioned
the idea of a treaty was Rear Admiral Thornton A.
Jenkins, commanding the squadron of the United
States Navy at Hongkong. Jenkins had arrived at
Singapore on November 28, 1872, with his two largest
warships, the "Colorado" and the "Lackawana." This
was in no way connected with Sumatra events and
merely followed the established custom of waiting for
the expected arrival of a new fiagship.^^
Studer talked with Jenkins about the Atjeh treaty,
and suggested that Jenkins stop at Atjeh. However,
^"^ The following facts, except where noted, are drawn from tliese
sources; Arifin's Procès Verbal of July 27, 1873; Arifin's Diary in the
same file; and Studer to Secretary H. Fish, March 18, 1873, No. 71,
Singapore, Vol. 10 in State (hereafter cited as Studer's account). The
accounts are not contradictory unless so indicated.
18 Admiral Jenkins to Secy, of Navy, Dec. 3, 1872, No. 78, U.S.
Navy, Asiatic Station, Jenkins, Naval Records Groups, National Archives,
Washington (hereafter cited as Jenkins), Vol. 1872, item No. 129.
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when Jenkins heard rumors of war, he very properly
decided not to go there lest he become involved.^'^
Shortly after this, in mid-December, Read went off
to Bangkok on official business. This departure is more
curious, particularly when the newspapers predicted
war with Atjeh at any moment. One wonders whether
Read was aware that war was not as imminent as the
public believed and absented himself to avoid any
suspicion of collusion with the subsequent actions of
his employee Arifin. The Atjehnese Premier arrived
just after Read left, and went first to Riau to forestall
an expected Dutch ultimatum, waiting there for six
weeks for a favorable Dutch reply.
When Admiral Jenkins returned to Singapore from
a trip to Calcutta on January 15, 1873, Arifin approached
him and asked whether he would conclude a treaty
with Atjeh the next time he came back. Jenkins re-
plied that unlike the British and Dutch, the United
States had no colonies or territorial ambitions. When
Jenkins left Singapore on January 23, he had made it
perfectly clear to Studer and Arifin that he was not
interested in visiting Atjeh.^ *^
THE ATJEH-AMERICAN TREATY
Two days later. Premier Tibang arrived from Riau
on the Dutch warship Marnix which had offered to take
him home to Atjeh. In view of Read's knowledge of
the possible appeal to foreign powers, it is surprising
that the Dutch should have given Tibang an opportunity
to stop at Singapore unless they desired an appeal to
be made. Arifin, the Dutch agent, arranged an inter-
view between Tibang and Studer on January 29, at
which he was to be present. Studer's version of the
interview is that Tibang said the Sultan was glad to
make a treaty, particularly in view of current Dutch
pressures. After displaying his powers to treat, he
asked Studer if he were ready to negotiate. Studer's
Í9 Studer's account, p. 9; Jenkins to Sec. Navy, April 24, 1873,
No. 24, Jenkins, Vol. 1873, No. 24.
20 Studer's account, p. 9; Jenkins to Sec. Navy, Jan. 19, 1873, No. 5
and Feb. 16, 1873, No. 7, Jenkins, Vol. 1873, Nos. 10, 13.
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report says, "I told him at once that I had no power at
all to make a treaty, neither was I authorized to ask
for one . . .,'* but he adhered to his original offer to
transmit t reaty proposals to Washington. Tibang then
said he had no idea what terms the United States
might want. Studer foolishly got drawn into a discus-
sion of this by asking what Atjeh would give. Tibang
referred to the decline of American trade, which he
hoped to revive, and offered Atjehnese protection of
American trade and an agreement not to treat with
any other powers. When Tibang kept insisting on
American desires, Studer suggested things like extra-
territoriality, property rights, security, religious freedom,
extradition, etc. Nothing was put into writing.
The account which Read obtained from Arifin agrees
almost entirely with Studer's, that Studer said that
he was not empowered to make a t reaty and that the
Atjehnese would have to draw it up, and then he
would send copies to Washington and Hongkong.
Read's account differs essentially in adding the story
of how the treaty was put into writing. "In order
to assure himself of the contents of the treaty Mo-
hamed Arifin made, so he said, in the form of the
treaty concluded between the various nations and
Siam . . .," a draft of which he read to Studer. That
Arifin came armed with a draft of a treaty puts a
new complexion on this conspiracy. It may be more
than coincidence that his employer was currently
interested in Siam. Studer felt he could find a bet-
ter example of a treaty, and read the text of the
Brunei Treaty which was translated into Malay and
writ ten down by Arifin "then and there."^^
Apparently realizing that he still had nothing to
prove that this dictation was Studer 's "treaty," Arifin
went back on January 31 and told Studer that Tibang
wanted a letter saying that he had called on Studer.
Without realizing that the letter would be used
21 Read to The Hague, June 15, 1873, No. 156, Buiten., Singapore,
Copying Book, 1873, Vol. 8, pp. 423-424.
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against him, Studer wrote Tibang a purely social letter
dated February 5, 1873, only mentioning his visit, and
nothing else.
Then, what is most incredible, Arifin did nothing for
two weeks, not even mentioning the interview to the
Dutch Vice Consul Meier, or to the Commander of
the Marnix who had access to all of the confidential ma-
terial on war preparations. One suspects that Read
was essential for the correct transmission of the news.^ ^
Arifin also managed to compromise the Italian Consul
by receiving an appeal from the Atjehnese.
After receiving a letter from Arifin, Read returned
to Singapore on February 13 and sent Arifin off to Riau
to tell Resident Schiff, giving him the rather generous
travel allowance of $2 per mile in addition to the $25
passage money. After his return from Riau, passage
paid by Schiff, Read gave Arifin about $45, and asked
Batavia's approval.^^ Was this the price of treachery?
For unexplained reasons Read waited two days after
his return to report Arifin's news, and then tele-
graphed only the following alarming teaser:
"Intrigues of great interest discovered of Atjehnese envoys
with the American and Italian Consuls which may call for
immediate consideration. Details by the first boat."^^
The next day he sent the following details by telegram:
"The envoys shovi'ed the American and Italian Consuls a
general letter from the Sultan and sought help against the
Dutch. American Consul at once promised that he would
write Admiral Jenkins in China and made a treaty of 12 articles
which must be signed by the Sultan and sent back here . . .
The Americans will apparently be ready to go in two months.
This information can be given full credence."-''
The effect in Batavia was electric. A telegram was
sent off to The Hague: "Consul General at Singapore
informs of treachery of Atjeh. Mission there of Amer-
22 Read to Loudon, Sept 6, 1873, At¡eh, Ralll.
23 Read to Loudon, March 3, 1873, p. 2, Atjeh, Ral.
24 Read to Loudon, Feb. 15, 1873, Bmten., Singapore, Vol. 8, p. 133.
25 Read to Loudon, Feb. 16, 1873, Buiten., Singapore, Vol. 8, pp.
134-135. »6 " ' ^
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ican and Italian Consuls against us. Both have meddled
in the question . . . American Consul presented a t reaty
to Atjeh and writes to Admiral in China.''^" In The
Hague on February 18 the King was asked to consider
the necessity of fulfillment of obligations of the treaty
of 1824 giving security to Atjeh, with peaceful measures,
of course, "as long as we are not compelled by Atjeh
itself to [use] force."-^ The Foreign Office was asked
to ask Washington and Rome to disavow their Consul's
actions and to clear the matter with other great powers,
on the basis of Dutch protection of commerce.^'* A
note was sent off to the Netherlands Minister in Washing-
ton which authorized him to read to Secretary of State
Fish a note describing how Dutch had "assumed the
task of assuring the security of navigation and com-
merce" of Atjeh according to treaties wi th the British,
that they had learned "that Atjehnese delegates are hav-
ing relations with the Consul of the United States at
Singapore, that he had the intention to conclude a
treaty with them and he even is preparing to call upon
the Admiral of the American fleet in the China Sea."
The Dutch government considered that such actions
might increase Atjehnese resistance, and was certain
that the United States cabinet would not want to impede
the Dutch, but rather give sympathy and support to
their "action civilisatrice.^^^^ As an afterthought, the
next day the Dutch asked the Secretary of State to re-
quest that Studer abstain from negotiations.^*^
The Hague replied skeptically to Batavia on Feb-
ruary 19:
If you do not doubt the truth of the information of Consul
28 Van de Putte to Foreign Office, Feb. 18, 1873 LaA4, p. 1, Atjeh
Ral.
27 Van de Putte to The King, Feb. 18, 1873 LaA4, p. 2, Atjeh Raï.
28 Van de Putte to Foreign Office, Feb. 18, 1873 LaA4, pp. 2-3,
Atjeh Ral.
29 Foreign Office to Netli. Min. Washington, Feb. 20, 1873, No. 5/16
Kab., Buiten., Moelykheden met Amerika over de Blokkade, 1872-
1874 (hereafter cited as Blokkade).
30 Foreign Office to Neth. Min. Washington, Feb. 21, 1873, No.
3/17 Kab. in Blokkade.
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Singapore . . . send strong naval force to Atjeh to ask ex-
planation and assurance of two-faced and treacherous
THE OPENING OF THE ATJEH WAR
This reply was as much as approval for invasion, and
without even waiting for written details from Read,
Loudon summoned an extraordinary meeting of the
Council of the Indies and military leaders on Febru-
ary 21. The next morning Loudon telegraphed The
Hague this summary of their decisions:
Council of Netherlands Indies at Batavia presided over by
me. General and Admiral present. It agreed on my proposal
to send a commissioner with four battalions to Atjeh as soon
as possible with an ultimatum to recognize us as sovereign or
war. We must confront America with fait accompli. Vice
President [Nieuwenhuyzen] is the man . . . LOUDON^^
In other words. Read had furnished Loudon with his
casus belli. Atjeh was given only two choices: to sur-
render under duress or to fight. Every Netherlander
who knew the history of Atjeh knew what the answer
would be.
If Loudon had any doubts at all that he had a good
excuse, they were dispelled on February 23 by the
receipt of Read's mail report. Loudon's reaction was:
"As long as our sovereignty is not recognized, there is
still the foreign interference to threaten us like the
Sword of Damocles."^^
Before Studer became aware of the plot against him.
Read used him for further evidence. When Ariñn re-
turned from Riau to Singapore on March 1, he prob-
ably reported to Read for instructions. He then went
to Studer and asked for another letter addressed to
Tibang, which he was given.-"** The letter was purely
a social greeting with expressions of good will.^ ^ How-
31 Loudon to van de Putte, March 1, 1873, p. 1, in Netherlands
Ministry of Colonies, Kolonien, Depot Schaarsbergen (hereafter cited
as Depot), file April 8, 1873, p. 1.
32 Ibid., p. 4.
33 Loudon to van de Putte, Feb. 25, 1873, p. 20 in file April 7, 1873
No. M8 Geh., Depot.
34 Arifin's diary, p. 16.
35 Read to Loudon, March 4, 1873, encL LaC, in Blokkade.
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ever, Arifin used it to "prove" that Studer had given
him simultaneously a plan of defense of Atjeh to carry
to Tibang. The diagram is so ridiculous from a military
standpoint that it is difficult to see how any historian
has ever given credit to it, especially from an officer
with five years service in the Civil war.
5000 men in
the woods
of the South
5000 in the interior
Harbor of
Atjeh
5000 in the
West
Read then tried to isolate Studer diplomatically by
discrediting him with the British, who, however, gave
no credence to Read's story.^ ^ When informed by the
British of Read's accusations, Studer asked to confront
Arifin.^' Arifin was hurried out of Singapore within
three days and was never allowed to see Studer again
despite the latter's repeated requests.^*
Meanwhile Dutch apprehensions were increased when
the following telegram was received in Batavia:
From a very reliable source news is received that the
American fleet at Hongkong has undoubtedly received orders
to steam to Atjeh to be there before us.
VICE PRESIDENT [NIEUWENHUYUEN] HEREwrrH INTORMED^^
Dutch archives only tell that the reliable source was a
Dutch trading company with offices in Hongkong.'*"'
Needless to say, there never were any such orders. As
we have noted, Jenkins had fully made up his mind
against any such action and Read knew it.
It is rather difficult to believe that The Hague was
unaware of the role Read was playing, for on March 6
van de Putte wrote Read to thank him for his "good
36 Telegram No. 117 in file April 15, 1873, No. Y3 Geh., Depot;
Studer's account, pp. 21-22.
37 Read to Loudon, March 6, 1873 in Buiten., Singapore Vol. 8,
p. 193; also May 14, 1873 Kab. 5 in Atjeh Ral.
38 Arifin's diary, p. 18.
30 Tel. No. 117 in file April 15, 1873, No. y3 Geh., Depot.
40 Loudon to van de Putte, March 6, 1873, file March 6, Kab. 3,
Blokkade.
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services" to the Dutch "especially as we experience
them again in all your doings respecting the latest
events in the Indian ArchipeJago, wherefore, allow me,
to express you my best thanks."^^
When cables kept pouring in from Batavia adding
information about Studer's conspiracy. The Hague
moved to obtain American disavowal.^^ At Dutch
urging, the American Minister cabled home:
Netherlands Government wish Consulate at Singapore tele-
graphed not to meddle with their affairs in Sumatra.-»»
When this arrived in Washington on March 6, it was
the first time that Secretary of State Fish had heard
of the affair. Since neither Studer, Batavia or The
Hague had even mentioned Atjeh within the last year,
he could only reply:
This government has no evidence that Consul at Singapore
is meddling—In the absence of specific information, it can-
not assume that he is acting otherwise than as duty requires.
If the Netherlands Covt. lay any complaints before this Govt.,
they will be carefully considered and the Consul will be in-
structed as our obligations to a friendly Power will require.
FISH SECRETARY '^*
Gorham handed a copy of this to Gericke on March 7.
When the Dutch persisted. Fish finally telegraphed
Studer on March 8:
Netherlands Government represents interference with its
affairs in Sumatra. Abstain from interference and report
f t 4 5
By March 7 The Hague was able to assure Batavia,
"America telegraphs to Singapore for information.
From that it further appears that Consul was not em-
powered" and "from previous telegram from America
*1 Van de Putte to Read, March 6, 1873, Buiten., Singapore Vol. 100.
42 Loudon to van de Putte, March 5, 1873, file March 5, Kab. 6,
mokkad^e; Gencke to Westenberg, March 5, 1873, file March 5, Kab 7
Blokkade.
43 Gorham to Fish, March 6, 1873, Despatches from U.S. Legation
The Hague, Vol. 20, in State.
, ,^ o Gorham, March 6, 1873, InstrucHons to tJie "Netherlands,
Vol. 15, pp. 189-190, in Sfafe.
LF ° Studer, March 8, 1873, Despatches to Consuls, Vol 69
?;o^i !^^^/?'^' Westenberg to Fish, March 8, 1873, Neih. Notes, Vol. 7(lö7U-la74;, m State.
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it appears negotiations of Consul unknown and un-
authorized."""' Influenced by the sincerity of American
disavowels van de Putte repented approving the ulti-
matum to Atjeh and sent off a telegram saying "we
wish and will not tie your negotiations with prohibition,
but think that sovereignty or war, as a demand will
make a bad impression elsewhere . . ."'^ ^
However, van de Putte was to find that a fait accompli
was being presented to him as well as to the Amer-
icans. On March 5, Read had cabled Loudon definite
news that the American fleet was not bound for
Atjeh.''« Despite the receipt of this news by March 6,
Nieuwenhuyzen was despatched to Atjeh on March S.*"*
In reply to The Hague's assurances of American
innocence, Loudon presented his ultimatum:
No other security thinkable than recognition of sovereignty.
Without that expedition has no purpose. Want positive orders
given at once or let me handle this on my own responsibility. î*"
Van de Put te replied on March 10 that he had
No objection if recognition of sovereignty were the result of
negotiations. But I cannot approve sovereignity as the first
demand . . .^^
When Loudon replied on March 12:
Want it immediately said which demand I must make. I
can really find no other starting point and there is no more
time to be lost.^^
The Hague gave in.
Nieuwenhuyzen stopped to see Read in Singapore
and certainly learned that there was no danger from
the American fleet, and possibly even heard of the
treachery of Arifin. Nieuwenhuyzen proceeded with
Ariñn to Atjeh, where, when the Sultan refused to re-
46 Van de Putte to Gericke, March 12, 1873, p . 2, Blokkade.
47 Ibid., p . 3.
48 File March 7, 1873, Kab. 4 in Blokkade.
50 Van de Putte to Gericke, March 12, 1873, p. 4 in file March 17,
Geh, Kah. in Blokkade. It is therefore incorrect to state that the U.S.
government disavowed the action "too late" as does the French author
Octave Collet, Terres et Peuples de Surnatra, p . 103, De Klerck, His-
tory, Vol. 2, p . 348, is more correct on tliis point.
51 Van de Fntte to Gericke, March 12, 1873, as cited above.
52 Idem.
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ceive the ultimatum from Arifin, Nieuwenhuyzen de-
clared war on March 26, 1873.'^ ^ Netherlands troops
landed and were driven back into the sea. Stronger
forces landed again and again, but were fought back
for thirty-five years. The Netherlands had under-
estimated that great human love of freedom which had
inspired their own forefathers to struggle valiantly
against Spanish oppression.
The Dutch people certainly did not universally ap-
prove of this aggression against Atjeh. There was a
great deal of opposition to it at the time, and it is no
longer regarded as quite so glorious a feat as many re-
garded it in the nineteenth century.
CONCLUSIONS
UNrrED STATES INNOCENCE. American, Dutch and
British archives demonstrate that the United States
was guiltless of causing the Atjeh war. The conquest
of Atjeh was a premeditated act of the Dutch, for which
a casus belli was sought. The Commissioner in charge
of negotiations with Atjeh had had an earlier success
in using the Americans as a scapegoat, and the ruse was
repeated. The accusations would be hardly credible to
students of American diplomatic history who know the
era of 1870 to 1896 as the most non-expansive in Amer-
ican foreign policy. The story is rendered more
incredible when we review the lack of American ter-
ritorial interest in Sumatra since 1874, and the end of
economic interests in 1873.
AMERICAN ANTI-COLONIALISM. Had the United States
been politically ambitious, the opening of the Atjeh
war would have been the finest opportunity to obtain
territorial control. The Atjehnese delegates were quite
prepared to concede territory and trade privileges to
any power that would assist them against Dutch ag-
gression. However, neither the American Consul Studer
nor his government desired such concessions. The
ß» [Nieuwenhuyzen to Loudanl, April 3, 1873 in Ruiten., Singa-
pore, Ingekommenstukken, 1873.
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United States remained true to its tradition of being
a non-colonial power.
AMERICAN SYMPATHY WrrH INDONESIANS. Far from
coveting territory in Atjeh, the American consul
Studer was sympathetic to Indonesian independence.
It was this very sympathy which led him so easily into
the clutches of the Dutch agent. No American could
help but listen to the appeals of the premier of a nation
which was about to lose its independence, even if he
could do nothing. Herein lies the greatest irony of the
Studer affair. The Americans were accused of doing
what they had no desire to do—acquire territory.
They failed to do what their natural sympathies called
upon them to do, to aid the cause of freedom from
colonial domination. They are remembered incorrectly
for starting the Atjeh war, when they should be re-
membered at least as neutral sympathizers in the fight
to preserve the freedom of the last independent area
of Indonesia.
Studer was merely the convenient scapegoat whose
name has not been vindicated. If Studer erred at all,
it was in being naive enough to be trapped by that
Dutch spy, Arifin, and his master. Read. From all ap-
pearances, he w^ as used by Read and Arifin to create a
casus belli for the conquest of Atjeh. The steps taken
by him on behalf of his government were perfectly
within diplomatic and consular usage; he offered to
transmit treaty proposals to Washington. Consider-
ing that Atjeh was an independent country which no
one denies it was then, the United States had as much
right to protest the transmittal of treaty proposals by
Dutch officials as the Dutch had to protest the same
by Americans.
After the war had begun, the Atjehnese sent Studer
a formal set of treaty proposals which Arifin had in-
duced them to believe the Americans might sign.
Studer transmitted them and the full powers of negotia-
tion signed by the Sultan to Washington, without pro-
test from the Dutch, It was merely deposited in the
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files of the State Department, where it remains
today.^ * It is a symbol of the once extensive relations
between the United States and Atjeh, now all but
forgotten. ,.
s* Enclosures to despatch No. 107, Oct. 4, 1873, Singapore, Vol. 11,
in Dept. of State Archives.
MacArthur Lauds Stonewall Jackson
A tribute by Gen. Douglas MacArthur to Lt. Gen.
"Stonewall" Jackson of Civil war fame as "a
complete master of the art of war" was released
recently by Jay W. Johns, president of the Stonewall
Jackson memorial in Lexington, Virginia.
Johns, of Charlottesville, Virginia, was in New
York for the unveiling of a bust of Jackson in the
New York University hall of fame.
Said MacArthur: "General Jackson was a complete
master of the art of war. He used its two greatest
elements, initiative and surprise, in unsurpassed ap-
plications.
"Swift and sure in attack, dogged and determined
in defense, undismayed by adverse odds, he was the
ideal battle line commander. His fearless independ-
ence of character, his spirited presentation of his own
views, however in conflict with those above him in
authority, can well serve as a model for every
officer of high field responsibility.
"I take great pride in the memory of my three
uncles who fought under his inspired leadership."
Johns said MacArthur had accepted an appointment
as a sponsor of the Jackson memorial.

